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This paper is a companion piece to the WUDQVODWLRQRI/¡JVWUXS¶VDUWLFOH³7KH&DWHJRU\DQG
WKH2IILFHRI3URFODPDWLRQZLWK3DUWLFXODU5HIHUHQFHWR/XWKHUDQG.LHUNHJDDUG´E\
Christopher Bennett and Robert Stern, which is also included in this issue of the journal. 
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/¡JVWUXS¶V
Critique of Kierkegaard 
 
Christopher Bennett, Paul Faulkner, and Robert Stern 
 
1. Introduction 
2QWKHIDFHRILWWKHSDSHU³7KH&DWHJRU\DQGWKH2IILFHRI3URFODPDWLRQZLWK3DUWLFXODU
5HIHUHQFHWR/XWKHUDQG.LHUNHJDDUG´E\WKHnearly forgotten Danish philosopher and 
theologian K.E. Løgstrup (1905±1981) may seem to hold little interest for the contemporary 
reader. Its central focus, which is on religious proclamation and its relation to the authority 
and office of the preacher or pastor, hardly appears to promise much philosophical 
excitement, as it relates WRDGHEDWHLQWKHWKHRORJ\RI/¡JVWUXS¶V time concerning the nature 
of religious proclamation that largely centered around the work of the theologian Rudolf 
%XOWPDQQDQGKLVGRFWULQHRI³NHU\JPD´1 Moreover, while the paper deals with Kierkegaard 
at some length, it does so by contrasting his vieZVZLWK0DUWLQ/XWKHU¶VZKRLVUDUHO\VHHQDV
a philosophically productive conversation partner. Thus, while the issues raised in this paper 
KDGVRPHUHVRQDQFHLQWKHWKHRORJ\RI/¡JVWUXS¶Vtime, it seems unlikely to have much to say 
to philosophy today. 
$SSHDUDQFHVKRZHYHUFDQEHGHFHSWLYH$WWKHKHDUWRI/¡JVWUXS¶VSDSHULWWXUQV
out, is a crucial question raised by Kierkegaard, namely how does one address a person on a 
matter of decisive importance without exercising undue authority over them? Neither 
.LHUNHJDDUGQRU/¡JVWUXSWKLQNVWKDWWKLVSUREOHPLVLQVXUPRXQWDEOH.LHUNHJDDUG¶VVROXWLRQ
is that we can express views about matters of fundamental personal significance but only in a 
way that at the same time undercuts the authority we appear to be claiming²this is his idea 
of indirect communication.2 Løgstrup rejects this solution. In doing so, he argues that 
                                                     
1
 See Rudolf Bultmann, ³7KH.HU\JPDRIWKH(DUOLHVW&KXUFK´DQG³7KH.HU\JPDRIWKH
+HOOHQLVWLF&KXUFK$VLGHIURP3DXO´FKDSVDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\RITheology of the New 
Testament, trans. Kendrick Grobel (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2007), pp. 33±185. 
2
 For examples of clear articulations of the notion of indirect communication, see Søren 
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard 
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, vol. 12.1 of .LHUNHJDDUG¶V:ULWLQJV, trans. Howard V. Hong et 
al., ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 
pp. 242, 325; henceforth CUP followed by page number; Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig 
Efterskrift, vol. 7 of Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn et al. 
(Copenhagen: Gads, 2002), pp. 220±1, 296±7; henceforth references to the Cappelørn et al. 
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.LHUNHJDDUG¶VIDLOXUHWRDOORZIRUDXWKRULW\VWHPVIURPKLVQLKLOLVPXVLQJ/XWKHUWRRIIHUD
provocative alternative approach. He also identifies proclamation as a distinctive speech act 
(though without using this terminology) in a way that is of philosophical interest in its own 
right.  
7RXQGHUVWDQG/¡JVWUXS¶VVWUDWHJ\ZHILUVWKDYHWRNQRZPRUHDERXW/¡JVWUXSWKH
context in which this paper was written, and in particular what lies behind the connection he 
draws in this text between proclamation, Kierkegaard, and Luther (§2). We will then look at 
the paper itself in some detail (§3) before moving on to evaluate the debate between Løgstrup 
and Kierkegaard (§4). The final section (§5) considers what makes proclamation distinctive 
as a speech act and the role of authority in it, relating these questions to the issue of 
normative powers.  
 
2. Background 
The paper that concerns us here was published LQLQ*HUPDQUDWKHUWKDQLQ/¡JVWUXS¶V
native Danish;3 it therefore appeared seven years EHIRUH/¡JVWUXS¶VPRVWFHOHEUDWHGZRUN
The Ethical Demand [Den etiske fordring], which was published in 1956.4 However, there is 
an important connection between the two pieces, as The Ethical Demand also makes the issue 
of proclamation central. The latter work begins with the proclamation of Jesus to love thy 
neighbor as thyself (ED 2±3/EF 10±11) and ends in chapter 12 with a discussion of the 
authority underlying this proclamation (ED 207±17/EF 232±43).5 
                                                     
edition will appear as SKS, followed by volume in Roman numerals and page number in 
Arabic numerals. References to the works of Kierkegaard refer to the translations by Howard 
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong and then to Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter. 
3
 )RUWKH*HUPDQRULJLQDOYHUVLRQVHH.(/¡JVWUXS³'LH.DWHJRULHXQGGDV$PWGHU
9HUNQGLJXQJLP+LQEOLFNDXI/XWKHUXQG.LHUNHJDDUG´Evangelische Theologie 
9:1±6 (1949), pp. 249±69; henceforth KAV, followed by page number. A version in Danish 
appeared the following year as ³Forkyndelsens Kategori og Embede med særligt Henblik paa 
3UREOHPVWLOOLQJHQKRV/XWKHURJ.LHUNHJDDUG´ Tidehverv, 24:2±3 (1950), pp. 14±26. The 
Danish version includes a small amount of material not found in the German version, which 
we have added to our translation in curly brackets. 
4
 In this essay we will cite Den Etiske Fordring (Copenhagen: Gyldendale, 1956; new edition 
ed. David Bugge, Aarhus: Klim, 2014); The Ethical Demand, translated by Theodor I. Jensen 
and Gary Puckering; revised with an introduction by Hans Fink and Alasdair MacIntyre 
(Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1997). A new translation of The Ethical Demand 
by Bjørn Rabjerg and Robert Stern is forthcoming from Oxford University Press. The 
abbreviations ED refer to the NDUP translation, and EF to the Klim edition. 
5
 &KDSWHULVWKHODVWFKDSWHURIWKHPDLQSDUWRIWKHWH[WIROORZHGE\D³SROHPLFDO
HSLORJXH´RQ.LHUNHJDDrd and then-contemporary Kierkegaardianism, in which some of the 
criticisms of Kierkegaard discussed below are also raised. 
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 In focusing on the issue of proclamation, both in the article and in The Ethical 
Demand,6 Løgstrup was engaging in a debate that had been raised by the theology of Rudolf 
Bultmann, who had made the category of proclamation²RULQKLVWHUPLQRORJ\³NHU\JPD´²
central. Bultmann had distinguished between hearing the Word of God as a neutral or 
objective report²thus as a standard form of communication²on the one hand, and on the 
other hand, as a call addressed to the individual directly, based on some authority; this thus 
represents a form of faith that goes beyond any grounding it could be given in philosophy or 
history and that is transformative of the individual in a profound way, if they respond 
appropriately to the call it represents.7 Thus, %XOWPDQQ¶VSRVLWLRQUDLVHd deep questions 
                                                     
6
 Løgstrup also discusses the issue of proclamation in reference to Kierkegaard in his 1950 
text .LHUNHJDDUG¶VDQG+HLGHJJHU¶VAnalysis of Existence and Its Relation to Proclamation, 
which is mentioned below (K.E. Løgstrup, Kierkegaards und Heideggers Existenzanalyse 
und ihr Verhältnis zur Verkündigung [Berlin: Erich Bläschker, 1950]; henceforth KHE, 
followed by page number). We also refer to the Klim edition, Kierkegaards og Heideggers 
Eksistensanalyse og dens forhold til forkyndelsen, ed. Svend Andersen (Aarhus: Klim, 2013); 
henceforth KE, followed by page number. The text takes a similar approach to the problem of 
authority that Løgstrup later develops in The Ethical Demand: he argues in both texts that 
³faith without understanding is not faith, but coercion´ (KHE 108; KE 98; see also ED 2/EF 
10). Unlike in the article we are discussing, and unlike in The Ethical Demand, in 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VDQG+HLGHJJHU¶V$QDO\VLVRI([LVWHQFH, Løgstrup argues that Kierkegaard and 
Heidegger can be used to provide a kind of ³test´ of any proclamation and whether it should 
be accepted. In this respect, he raises the following kinds of question: Does the proclamation 
leave the individual at the mercy of the crowd or not? Does it enable them to remain true to 
their existence as becoming and possibility or not? Does it offer an absolute certainty or 
instead leave room for the individual to assume their own responsibility? And does it 
subordinate existence to thought or vice versa? (see KHE 116; KE 105). 
7
  In this respect, consider the following reflection from Bultmann: ³Is it enough to say that 
faith grows out of the encounter with the Holy Scriptures as the Word of God, that faith is 
nothing but simple hearing? The answer is yes. But this answer is valid only if the Scriptures 
are understood neither as a manual of doctrine nor as a record of witnesses to a faith which I 
interpret by sympathy and empathy. On the contrary, to hear the Scriptures as the Word of 
God means to hear them as a word which is addressed to me, as kerygma, as a proclamation. 
Then my understanding is not a neutral one, but rather my response to a call. The fact that the 
word of tKH6FULSWXUHVLV*RG¶V:RUGFDQQRWEHGHPRQVWUDWHGREMHFWLYHO\LWLVDQHYHQW
ZKLFKKDSSHQVKHUHDQGQRZ*RG¶V:RUGLVKLGGHQLQWKH6FULSWXUHVDVHDFKDFWLRQRI*RG
is hidden everywhere´ (Rudolph Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles 
SFULEQHU¶V6RQVS). )RUDKHOSIXOVXPPDU\RI%XOWPDQQ¶VSRVLWLRQsee Gerhard 
Ebeling, Theology and Proclamation: A Discussion with Rudolf Bultmann, trans. John Riches 
(London: Collins, 1966). Consider, in particular, the following remark from Ebeling: 
³According to Bultmann we are concerned in the kerygma, not in the first place with the 
imparting of information, but with a challenge which demands from us obedience and 
decision, and which is addressed to the will or, to be more precise, to the conscience. The 
kerygma, thus seen as a challenge, qualifies anew the situation of the man to whom it is 
addressed. That is to say, that the kerygma considered as Word is an event which overtakes 
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concerning the tension between theology and philosophy, faith and reason, acceptance of 
*RG¶V:RUGDQGPDNLQJWKDW:RUGLQWHOOLJLEOH 
 In The Ethical Demand/¡JVWUXSEHJLQVE\FRQVLGHULQJ-HVXV¶FRPPDQGPHQW to love 
RQH¶VQHLJKERU as a proclamation and argues forcefully that if this is not to be a coercive form 
of obscurantism, the proclamation must be something that we do not just accept on authority 
but rather connects to some fundamental feature of our existence (ED 1±2/EF 9±10). This 
fundamental feature, Løgstrup claims, is our dependence on one another, a dependence that 
KHWKLQNVPDNHVSHUIHFWVHQVHRI-HVXV¶SURFODPDWLRQWRXVto love your neighbor8 in purely 
human terms out of which the ethical demand to care for the other person arises (ED 3/EF 
11)7KHUHLVWKXVDQLPSRUWDQWGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQXVDQG-HVXV¶FRQWHPSRUDULHVZKHQLW
comes to his proclamation to love RQH¶V neighbor: when Jesus proclaimed it, the love 
commandment may have struck his audience as puzzling in a way that meant they had to 
accept it on the authority of revelation, as the idea of loving all, including the neighbor and 
the stranger, would have seemed fundamentally alien to the ethical outlook of the times. 
However, for us (Løgstrup suggests), this is no longer the case, as we can now understand 
what makes it valid in a way that no longer makes it a matter of revelation or authority²and 
if we did now accept it on those latter terms, we would be loving our neighbor in the wrong 
way, as we would then love them based on this authority rather than their own ethical 
standing (ED 208±9/EF 234). 
 At the same time, however, as a thinker who was equally deeply interested in 
theological issues, Løgstrup also recognized that this approach to the proclamation still left 
him with a theological puzzle: namely that if the love commandment can be made sense of in 
purely human terms, what happens to the authority of Jesus? Does this make him no more 
than a profound moral teacher, the first to make clear to us that our relations of love should 
go beyond partner, family, or community, but also include the stranger and even the enemy in 
a way we can all now understand²even if we still find it a difficult (or impossible) ideal to 
live up to? Yet, of course, to see Jesus as just a moral teacher is to no longer see Jesus as the 
son of God. But, on the other hand, if to see Jesus as the son of God we need to view him as 
speaking with divine authority, how can he exercise authority over us on this matter without 
reducing the love commandment to an order we blindly follow rather than something we 
understand, generating the problems outlined above? 
                                                     
the man who hears it and forces him to a decision between faith and unfaith, and 
consequently to a decision about his own understanding of himself´ (p. 41). 
8
 Mark 12:31 Revised Standard Version. 
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 In The Ethical Demand/¡JVWUXS¶VVROXWLRQWRWKLVSUREOHPLVDUDWKHULQJHQLRXVRQH
KHDUJXHVWKDW-HVXV¶DXWKRULW\LQUHODWLRQWRWhe proclamation lies not as the source for our 
acceptance of the love commandment (which instead can come from seeing why it matters to 
love the other and how this relates to our human interdependence), but rather lies in his 
declaration that we will be forgiven by God for failing to love the other in the way that is 
required, so that the authority Jesus is exercising here is that of divine forgiveness, not of 
command (ED 212/EF 237±8). Moreover, Løgstrup argues, it is only a divine judge such as 
God, or Jesus acting on his behalf, who can offer such forgiveness to us; no other human 
being can do so, as we are all as equally prone to failure as everyone else and so lack the 
requisite standing to give us the authority required to forgive other people in this manner (ED 
207/EF 232).  
As this brief sketch suggests, therefore, in his main work Løgstrup showed how the 
issue of proclamation, which may appear to be a theological matter with few philosophical 
implications, in fact has widespread ramifications for how one thinks of a number of 
fundamental issues, such as the relation between philosophy and theology, the role of 
authority in ethics, how far authority is exercised in different forms of interaction, what 
different kinds of authority there might be and how they can be legitimated. In this paper, we 
will go on to discuss similar themes that also come up in the article²in particular, the issue 
of the authority of proclamation for the apostles, preachers, or pastors who speak of 
forgiveness.  
Moreover, as we shall see, in this article Løgstrup also uses this issue to mount a 
critique of Kierkegaard and his doctrine of indirect communication. Critiquing Kierkegaard is 
DQLPSRUWDQWIHDWXUHRI/¡JVWUXS¶VZLGHUscholarshipLQFOXGLQJWKH³SROHPLFDOHSLORJXH´LQ
The Ethical Demand, .LHUNHJDDUG¶VDQG+HLGHJJHU¶V$QDO\VLVRI([LVWHQFHDQG,ts Relation 
to Proclamation [Kierkegaards und Heideggers Existenzanalyse und ihr Verhältnis zur 
Verkündigung] from 1950, and Controverting Kierkegaard [Opgør med Kierkegaard] from 
1968.9 /¡JVWUXS¶VUHODWLRQWR.LHUNHJDDUGLVLQIDFWUDWKHUFRPSOH[IRUZKLOHKLVDWWLWXGHWR
Kierkegaard certainly became highly negative, in his earlier period he was involved with the 
Tidehverv movement in Denmark, which was closely associated with the Kierkegaard revival 
                                                     
9
 K.E. Løgstrup, Opgør med Kierkegaard (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1968); Controverting 
Kierkegaard, trans. Kristian-Alberto Lykke Cobos and Kees van Kooten Niekerk (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
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led by Kierkegaardians such as K. Olesen Larsen.10 However, he increasingly came to have 
misgivings about their approach, and they in turn increasingly criticized him from their 
radical Kierkegaardian perspective11²and in these debates Løgstrup largely took their 
reading of Kierkegaard to be accurate in a way that might be disputed today, as we shall see.  
At the heart of these disputes was the issue of nihilism, or more precisely nihilism 
about our earthly, human, finite existence. For, of course, while no one could dispute that 
Kierkegaard saw value in the transcendent, divine, and infinite, the question was how far any 
such value could be found here on earth7R.LHUNHJDDUG¶VUDGLFDOSRVW-war followers, such 
as Olesen Larsen, it was clear that Kierkegaard in the end believed that while we must live in 
the finite, we must retain a kind of ironic distance from it, seeing through it as merely relative 
rather than absolute and looking for the latter elsewhere²which, given the horrors of the war 
time experience, represents a kind of pessimism about the human that can surely be 
understood given the historical context.12 However, Løgstrup found he could not endorse this 
pessimism, as he thought it took us too far from any proper ethical engagement with others 
around us, replacing it with a relation to the divine and so supplanting the ethical relation by 
directing us toward the religious (God) rather than the ethical (the neighbor).13 One response 
to Løgstrup (which readers might take today) would be to argue that Løgstrup here 
H[DJJHUDWHVWKHGXDOLVPRIWKH.LHUNHJDDUGLDQSRVLWLRQDQGWKDWLQIDFWDNLQGRI³UHWXUQ´WR
the finite can be found within it, such WKDWLWLVDPLVWDNHWRVHH.LHUNHJDDUGDV³QHJDWLQJ´WKH
value of the worldly in the manner that concerns Løgstrup. However, the response of Larsen 
DQGRWKHU.LHUNHJDDUGLDQVRI/¡JVWUXS¶VWLPHZDVQRWWRWDNHWKLVFRQFHVVLYHURXWH;14 instead 
they hardened their dualistic reading of Kierkegaard and used it to criticize Løgstrup for his 
                                                     
10
 For a brief discussion of Tidehverv DQG/¡JVWUXS¶VUHODWLRQWRLWVHH.HHVYDQ.RRWHQ
Niekerk, ³7KH*HQHVLVRI.(/¡JVWUXS¶V9LHZRI0RUDlity as a Substitute,´ in Concern for 
the Other: Perspectives on the Ethics of K.E. Løgstrup, ed. Svend Andersen and Kees van 
Kooten Niekerk (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), pp. 55±84, esp. 62±3. 
11
 See ibid., pp. 62±3. 
12
 See, for H[DPSOH.2OHVHQ/DUVHQ³1RJOH%HP UNQLQJHURP)RUKROGHWPHOOHP
+XPDQLVPHRJ.ULVWHQGRP´Tidehverv 31 (1957), pp. 77±³6RPH5HPDUNVRQWKH
Relation between +XPDQLVPDQG&KULVWLDQLW\´WUDQV.HHVYDQ.RRWHQ1LHNHUNDQG5REHUW
6WHUQ/RJVWUXS¶V(WKLFal Demand, 
https://ethicaldemand.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/larsen-humanism-and-christianity-
translation-final1.pdf (accessed February 18, 2019). 
13
 As Løgstrup puts it in WKH³SROHPLFDOHSLORJXH´WRThe Ethical Demand, for Kierkegaard 
³WKHUHODWLRQVKLSWR*RGLVPHDQWWRVHUYHDVDZD\RIOLEHUDWLQJSHRSOHIURPKDYLQJDQ\WKLQJ
WRGRZLWKRWKHUV´(' 
14
 For an introduction to Olesen /DUVHQ¶V.LHUNHJDDUGLDQWKHRORJ\VHH Bjørn Rabjerg, 
Løgstrup og Kierkegaard (Aarhus: Klim, 2018), pp. 159±63. 
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³KXPDQLVP´15 for seeing absolute value in finite, human existence. This persuaded Løgstrup 
that Kierkegaard was a figure ultimately to be rejected, which explains his increasingly 
negative view of WKHODWWHU¶VZRUN7KHDUWLFOHZHDUHGLVFXVVLQJLVWKHILUVWFOHDUVWHSLQWKLV
process, where Løgstrup seeks to distance himself from what he takes to be the 
Kierkegaardian view, as we will discuss further in the next section. 
Finally, as the third piece of background information needed to understand this article, it 
LVLPSRUWDQWWRVD\VRPHWKLQJDERXW/¡JVWUXS¶VYLHZRI/XWKHU²for it is Luther (perhaps 
unexpectedly) that Løgstrup uses as a foil with which to criticize the Kierkegaardian nihilism 
outlined above. Leaning on the Lutheran conception of creation, and in particular the 
/XWKHUDQGRFWULQHRI³RUGLQDQFHV´(Ordnungen),16 Løgstrup suggests that, on this account, 
Luther in fact gives value to the finite world insofar as it is brought into being by God and 
structured in accordance with his purposes, including at the level of its social structures 
(KAV 253±4). Thus, in seeing these social structures DV³RUGHUV´EXLOWDURXQGWKHKRXVHKROG
(which consists RIIDPLO\DQGZRUNLQJOLIHWKHVWDWHDQGWKHFKXUFKRQ/XWKHU¶VDFFRXQW
each of us can be given a meaningful and valuable vocation or calling, while within these 
structures there are authority relations we have over others in a manner that is ordained by 
God, such as parents over their children, or ruler over subjects.17 In this way, then, Løgstrup 
thought he could use Luther to build a case against Kierkegaard, by bringing out the 
significant differences between them and using the former to dispute the degradation of the 
ILQLWHWKDWKHIRXQGLQWKHODWWHU8OWLPDWHO\/¡JVWUXSGLGQRWZDQWWRXVH/XWKHU¶VRZQ
approach to these matters in an uncritical way, or to accept the details of his position, 
including his view of the ordinances18²but he did clearly find it a useful conception with 
                                                     
15
 See Olesen /DUVHQ³1RJOH%HP UNQLQJHU.´ 
16
 6HHIRUH[DPSOH/XWKHU¶VOHFWXUHVRQ*HQHVLVZKHUHKHZULWHVWKDW³7KLVOLIHLVSURILWDEO\
GLYLGHGLQWRWKUHHRUGHUVOLIHLQWKHKRPHOLIHLQWKHVWDWHOLIHLQWKH&KXUFK´in 
Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe 65 vols in 127 (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau, 
1883±1993), vol. 43, p.  30 [hereafter WA, cited by volume and page number]; /XWKHU¶V
Works 55 vols (St. Louis and Philadelphia: Concordia and Fortress Press, 1958±86), vol. 3, p. 
217 [hereafter LW, cited by volume and page number).  
17
 See for example Martin Luther, &RQIHVVLRQ&RQFHUQLQJ&KULVW¶V6XSSHU, WA 26: 504/LW 
37: ³%XWWKHKRO\RUGHUVDQGWUXHUHOLJLRXVLQVWLWXWLRQVHVWDEOLVKHGE\*RGDUHWKHVH
three: the office of the priest, the estate of marriage, the civil government . . . For these three 
UHOLJLRXVLQVWLWXWLRQVRURUGHUVDUHIRXQGLQ*RG¶V:RUGDQGFRPPDQGment ´ 
18
 )RUIXUWKHUGLVFXVVLRQRI/¡JVWUXS¶VYLHZRI/XWKHURQRUGLQDQFHVDQGKRZLWGHYHORSHG
see Kees van Kooten Niekerk, ³/¡JVWUXS¶V5RDGWRThe Ethical Demand´trans. Kees van 
Kooten Niekerk, https://ethicaldemand.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/niekerk-lc3b8gstrup_s-
road-final.pdf DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\$OVRVHH1LHNHUN¶VtUDQVODWRU¶VLQWURGXction to 
K.E. Løgstrup, ³7KH$QWKURSRORJ\RI.DQW¶V(WKLFV´ trans. Kees van Kooten Niekerk, in 
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ZKLFKWRWKLQNWKURXJKZKDWDQDOWHUQDWLYHWR.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSRVLWLRQDVKHXQGHUVWRRGLW
might look like and thus as an impetus in developing his own views, as we shall now see by 
looking at the article itself. 
 
3. The Paper 
At the center RI/¡JVWUXS¶VSDSHUwe ZLOOVXJJHVWLVDFKDOOHQJHWR.LHUNHJDDUG¶VPHWKRGRI
LQGLUHFWFRPPXQLFDWLRQWKDWLV.LHUNHJDDUG¶VDXWKRULDOVWUDWHJ\RIQRWVSHDNLQJLQKLVRZQ
voice, by writing in such a way that it leaves it up to his readers to determine for themselves 
what is being said and on what basis it should be accepted²for example, by using 
pseudonyms, multiple retellings, irony, and paradoxical expressions. Løgstrup focuses on 
ZKDWKHWDNHVWREHRQHFHQWUDOUDWLRQDOHIRUWKLVDSSURDFKZKLFKLV.LHUNHJDDUG¶VFRQFHUQ
over authorial authority.19 This concern arises for Kierkegaard because when it comes to the 
communication of significant existential matters such as how to live ethically or how to relate 
oneself to God, there is a danger that the authority of the speaker will take away from the 
DXGLHQFH¶V ability to think and decide for themselves, thereby compromising their proper 
relation to questions of such decisive importance to the individual and submerging them in 
the crowd.20 Løgstrup holds that Kierkegaard adopts the strategy of communicating in a way 
that attempts to avoid any such exercise of authorial authority and so takes an indirect 
approach instead, which leaves it open to the reader how to respond to his writings. 
Kierkegaard thus takes Socrates as his model, whose maieutic approach is not to impose 
                                                     
:KDWLV(WKLFDOO\'HPDQGHG".(/¡JVWUXS¶V3KLORVRSK\RI0RUDO/LIH, ed. Hans Fink and 
Robert Stern (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2017), pp. 19±23.  
19
 Løgstrup presents Heidegger and Kierkegaard as sharing this concern: ³Heidegger further 
makes clear that the consequence of this must be that the words and deeds that result from 
life with others must thereby be determined in such a way that the others²each for 
themselves²also has the task to live their life as their own responsibility. The same 
consequence plays an extraordinary role in the thought of Kierkegaard. To dwell on this 
further would take us too far afield; but it is this consequence that leads him to put such an 
emphasis on the dialectic of communication or indirect communication´ (KHE 71±2; KH 64±
5). 
20
 For example, Kierkegaard writes the following: ³To stop a man on the street and to stand 
still in order.to speak with him is not as difficult as having to say something to a passerby in 
passing, without standing still oneself or delaying the other, without wanting to induce him to 
go the same way, but just urging him to go his own way²and such is the relation between an 
existing person and an existing person when the communication pertains to the truth as 
existence-inwardness´ (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 277/SKS VII: 251).  
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himself on his audience but to bring out what is already latent within them in a way that does 
not overrule their capacity to think for themselves.21 
1RZ/¡JVWUXS¶VFKDOOHQJHWR.LHUNHJDDUGLQWKLVSDSHUFDQEHSXWDVIROORZV: 
Kierkegaard confuses communication with proclamation and as a result sees a need for 
LQGLUHFWFRPPXQLFDWLRQZKHQLQIDFWWKHUHLVQRQH/¡JVWUXS¶VDUJument can be put in the 
form of a dilemma. On the one hand, in the case of communication, there is in fact no 
exercise of authority, so no indirect communication is required. On the other hand, in the case 
of proclamation, there is an exercise of authority, but to accept a proclamation on the basis of 
legitimate authority is unproblematic, so, again, no indirectness is required. Either way, 
WKHUHIRUH.LHUNHJDDUG¶VJURXQGVIRUDGRSWLQJKLVVWUDWHJ\RILQGLUHFWFRPPXQLFDWLRQDUH
based on the mistaken assumption that as he does indeed lack the requisite authority to 
proclaim, then all he can do is communicate indirectly instead, which he believes involves no 
exercise of authority²but if (as Løgstrup claims) direct communication involves no authority 
anyway, then no such indirectness is needed. We will now consider in more detail how 
Løgstrup develops this argument.   
/¡JVWUXS¶VSDSHUEHJLQVLQE\GLVWLQJXLVKing between proclamation and 
communication (see, in particular, KAV 249).22 In proclamation, Løgstrup argues, one 
³brings something into force´23 in relation to the other person and impacts them through a 
linguistic act much like a performative, such as a promise or command, which depends on 
some sort of recognitive response from the recipient (ibid.). This, indeed, does involve an 
exercise of some authority or normative power. However, Løgstrup claims, the case of 
communication is different because in communicating something to a person (even if what is 
said is of fundamental importance), one simply states what one takes to be the case, 
                                                     
21
 )RUH[DPSOH.LHUNHJDDUGZULWHVDVIROORZV³[A]t most [Socrates] was capable of 
artistically, maieutically helping another person negatively to the same view. Everything 
subjective, which on account of its dialectical inwardness evades the direct form of 
expression, LVDQHVVHQWLDOVHFUHW´Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 80/SKS VII: 80). 
)RUDWKRURXJKGLVFXVVLRQRI.LHUNHJDDUG¶VYLHZRI6RFUDWHVVHH-DFRE+RZODQG
Kierkegaard and Socrates: A Study in Philosophy and Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
22
 In the Danish version of this paper, Løgstrup introduces a third category here that he 
contrasts with the other two, namely that of a message ³Forkyndelsens Kategori og 
Embede´SS±6). As he characterizes it, a message is more fateful than a communication 
and so involves the message-giver more in the life of the recipient, but this involvement still 
lacks the element of authority that is crucial to the proclamation. 
23
 7KH*HUPDQLV³WULWWIULKQLQ.UDIW,´ZKHUH³LQ.UDIW´VXJJHVWVQRWMXVWWKDWWKH
proclamation is in force for the person in the sense of having validity or authority for them, 
but also has an impact on them. 
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ultimately leaving it up to the audience whether to accept it or not so that the relation does 
not rest on the authority of the communicator, and no authority is exercised in 
communication (ibid.)7KXVDV/¡JVWUXSSXWVLWLQWKHFDVHRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQ³WKHUHODWLRQ
between the informant and the recipient is exhausted in the message, as it were´ibid.), as I 
pass over the propositional content of what I say to you, and you decide whether to take it up 
or not, leaving no space for the exercise of authority.24 As we shall see, this initial distinction 
between communication and proclamation is crucial to the argument against Kierkegaard that 
Løgstrup develops later in the article. 
Having suggested that proclamation involves authority while communication does 
not, Løgstrup now turns in §2 to consider the nature of this authority, which is when he 
brings Luther into the discussion. For, he argues, the authority involved here is that of 
holding a particular office, and he uses Luther to explain how that might be conceived (KAV 
251±2). When it comes to religious proclamation, Luther took himself to be following St. 
Paul in distinguishing between the apostle, who is directly called to their office by God, and 
the proclaimer within the Church, who has their authority bestowed on them by the human 
community and is only indirectly related to God², but nonetheless this gives the proclaimer 
a legitimacy that does not belong to a private individual and as such their authority is more 
than mere power.25 Likewise, Løgstrup argues, Luther held that non-religious proclamation 
DQGDXWKRULW\ZLWKLQZRUOGO\RIILFHVDOVRXOWLPDWHO\VWHPVIURP*RG¶VRUGHULQJRIRXUOLYHV
WRJHWKHULQWKHVHWHUPVVRWKDW³DXWKRULW\LQWKHRWKHURIILFHVLVJLYHQVRWKDWLWFDQEH
exercised in the name of God; and therefore a person must have a calling in worldly activity 
DVPXFKDVLQVSLULWXDODFWLYLW\´KAV 253). 
Having explained how authority connects to proclamation, in §3 of his paper, 
Løgstrup turns to consider .LHUNHJDDUG¶Vaccount of authority in communication. Løgstrup 
EHJLQVZLWK.LHUNHJDDUG¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQDQREMHFWLYHIDFWXDOWUXWKDQGVXEMHFWLYH
                                                     
24
 See also K.E. Løgstrup, ³Fænomenologi og pV\NRORJL´LQSolidaritet og kærlighed og 
andre essays (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1987), pp. 116±40; ³3KHQRPHQRORJ\DQG
3V\FKRORJ\´WUDQV+DQV)LQNDQG5REHUW6WHUQ/¡JVWUXS¶V(WKLFDO'HPDQG Resources and 
Links, https://ethicaldemand.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/logstrup-phenomenology-and-
psychology-translation-final1.pdf (accessed January 28, 2019), pp. 1±19. In this essay, 
Løgstrup writes the following³,WLVQRWDV.LHUNHJDDUGWKRXJKWFRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶V
indirectness, but on the contrary its openness, that makes the other free. With sincerity a 
person gives us security and freedom, for with sincerity they deplete their own possibilities 
for exerting power and authority´ ³3KHQRPHQRORJ\DQG3V\FKRORJ\´S³Fænomenologi 
og pV\NRORJL´S133). 
25
 6HHWKHUHIHUHQFHVJLYHQE\/¡JVWUXSLQKLVSDSHUWR/XWKHU¶VFRPPHQWDU\RQ6W
3DXO¶V(SLVWOHWRWKH*DODWLDQV:$/: 
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decisive truth.26 Objective truth is not decisive in shaping the individual into who they are, so 
it can be communicated directly. However, decisive truth does impact the individual, and 
they are therefore not able to relate to it objectively. When such a truth is communicated, 
there is a danger of either one individual imposing their own self-conception on another or 
reducing what is communicated into an objective matter. Thus, Løgstrup explains that for 
.LHUNHJDDUG³Direct communication, if it concerns a decisive truth, is a contradictory 
XQGHUWDNLQJ´KAV 255). Moreover, as the decisive truth for Kierkegaard concerns the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VUHODWLRQRIGHSHQGHQFHRQ*RGLIRQHZHUHWRWU\WRFRPPXQLFDWHWKLVGLUHFWO\
one would make the other person dependent on oneself instead of God, thus precisely 
undermining what one is trying to communicate (ibid.). 
Løgstrup argues that this then leads Kierkegaard to set up the difficulty for which 
indirect communication is the answer (KAV 256). The issue is this: when it comes to 
communicating objective matters, Kierkegaard sees that the relation between communicator 
and recipient is impersonal, does not involve an intention to interfere with the self-conception 
of the recipient, and still counts as communication regardless of how the recipient responds, 
so it does not involve any problematic authority relation. But he takes each of these relations 
to be different when the content is an essential and decisive truth, as it is in the case of 
Christianity, and it is this difference that generates the problem of authority. Løgstrup thus 
WUHDWV.LHUNHJDDUG¶VVWUDWHJ\RILQGLUHFWFRPPXQLFDWLRQDs an answer to this problem²for 
example, by offering two contradictory possibilities that the recipient must choose between or 
by making sure the recipient has no grounds on which to admire the communicator and so to 
take their assertion seriously. The problem is particularly acute when it comes to Christianity, 
which does at one level have what looks like an objective doctrinal content: if this is all that 
is communicated, Christianity becomes cut off from our subjective existence, but attempts to 
connect its message to our existence will fail if communicated directly. Løgstrup suggests 
that Kierkegaard treats the paradoxical nature of Christianity as crucial in resolving this 
difficulty, as this again cannot be communicated without leaving the individual free to decide 
KRZWRUHVSRQGWRWKHSDUDGR[RI³*RGEHFRPHPDQ´(KAV 258), as each of us has to 
struggle resolve it for ourselves. Likewise, Løgstrup argues, Kierkegaard understood being 
IDFHGZLWKWKLVSDUDGR[DVDZD\RIOLEHUDWLQJWKHLQGLYLGXDOIURP³OLIHLQWKHFURZG´LQVRIDU
DV³WKHSDUDGR[FRQIURQWVWKHLQGLYLGXDOZLWKWKHFKRLFHEHWZHHQIDLWKDQGRIIHQVHWKDWWKH\
                                                     
26
 See, for example, Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 21±2/SKS 7: 29±
30. 
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FDQRQO\PHHWDORQH´KAV /¡JVWUXSWKXVORFDWHV.LHUNHJDDUG¶VZRUNLQDFHUWDLQ
³SROHPLFDOVLWXDWLRQ´ (ibid.), as he sought to replace Christendom with a more genuine form 
of Christianity and turned to the paradox and hence indirect communication as a means to do 
so. 
+DYLQJRXWOLQHGZKDWKHWDNHVWREH.LHUNHJDDUG¶VDUJXPHQWLQIDYRURILQGLUHFW
communication, Løgstrup then notes an important exception to this argument that is 
emphasized by Kierkegaard himself: the apostle. Kierkegaard allows this exception, Løgstrup 
suggests, because while the apostle communicates a matter of decisive significance, 
Kierkegaard holds that they are not communicating on their own behalf but on behalf of God, 
and so they do not bring their audience under their own personal authority but exercise this 
authority based on a calling that has come to them through the paradox of divine revelation 
(KAV 261). Løgstrup suggests that this allows Kierkegaard to treat the apostle as engaging in 
direct communication, for here the authority he sees as involved in communication does not 
XQGHUPLQH*RG¶VDXWKRULW\KHLVWKHUHIRUHKDSS\WRWUHDWWKHLUSUHDFKLQJDVDVSHFLDl form of 
direct communication, which means he fails to distinguish this preaching from 
communication in the way that Løgstrup takes to be crucial (KAV 262). 
This then means, Løgstrup argues, that there is a fundamental difference between 
Luther and Kierkegaard on these matters (ibid.). Luther just focuses on the category of 
proclamation and does not confuse proclamation with communication as Kierkegaard does; 
moreover, Luther is also happy to extend the authority involved in the latter beyond the 
apostles. By contrast, Kierkegaard does not really distinguish between the authority involved 
in communication of a decisive matter and proclamation. The important distinction for 
Kierkegaard is rather between direct and indirect communication, and he thinks that only 
Jesus and the apostles have authority to communicate directly on matters of decisive 
importance to the individual. (And since a direct communication of decisive importance is 
what he understands proclamation to be, proclamation thus falls under the category of 
communication in a way that it does not for Luther/¡JVWUXS¶VDUJXPHQWDJDLQVW
Kierkegaard is, then, that communication even concerning a decisive matter such as 
Christianity need not involve the exercise of authority, and hence the Kierkegaardian 
requirement for indirect communication is undermined. On the other hand, proclamation and 
hence the exercise of authority within the Church is unproblematic because it can be justified 
(KAV 263). 
In §4 of his essay, Løgstrup turns to consider why Luther was content to extend the 
authority involved in proclamation beyond the apostles, in a way that Kierkegaard was 
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XQZLOOLQJWRGRDQGZKDWWKLVGLYHUJHQFHWHOOVXVDERXWWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHYLHZVRI*RG¶V
relation to the world and thus of the value and meaning that resides in it. The crucial 
difference between them, Løgstrup argues, is as follows: Luther was prepared to see God as 
RUGDLQLQJVWUXFWXUHVHYHQZLWKLQWKHKXPDQZRUOGDQGWKXVZLWKLQWKH³ZRUOGO\government 
[Regiment]´VRWKDWWKRVH with offices within these structures could derive their authority 
from God, whereas Kierkegaard was not prepared to make this move, as he sought a greater 
GHJUHHRIVHSDUDWLRQEHWZHHQWKH³VSKHUHRILPPDQHQFH´DQGWKH³VSKHUHRIWUDQVFHQGHQFH´
and so between the relative value of the finite and the absolute value of the infinite (KAV 
264). This means that he could only recognize the apostle as having an immediate vocation 
from God but not the kind of mediated vocation that Luther was prepared to allow, which 
then makes it possible to extend the authority of proclamation beyond the apostolate.   
However, Løgstrup argues, if we follow Luther and extend authority to other religious 
offices, such as that of the pastor, where that authority is now traced back to God rather than 
residing in the individual, we can see how there is no problem of indirect communication for 
those in such offices (KAV 266). For, while the pastor may be proclaiming rather than just 
communicating, and so is exercising authority as a result, the proclamation is now no longer a 
matter of one individual exercising their individual authority over another in a way that 
ZRXOGLQWHUIHUHZLWKWKHODWWHU¶VUHODWLRQWR*RG precisely because they are speaking for God 
(say, in conveying to their audience that they have divine forgiveness). Thus, if we accept a 
SRVLWLRQPRUHOLNH/XWKHU¶VWKDQOLNH.LHUNHJDDUG¶V/¡JVWUXSDUJXHVWKHUHLVQRQHHGWR
think that indirect communication is required with respect to proclamation, even though here 
the exercise of authority is involved, since on the Lutheran account, ³*RGLVWKHVRXUFHRIDOO
authority, so that here the single and only bearer of authority [i.e. God], by performing what 
is proclaimed, brings it into force for WKRVHWRZKRPLWLVSURFODLPHG>E\IRUJLYLQJWKHP@´
(KAV 267). 
Finally, Løgstrup then relates this difference between Luther and Kierkegaard to wider 
DVSHFWVRIWKHLUSRVLWLRQV)LUVWKHQRWHVWKDW/XWKHU¶V³SROHPLFDOVLWXDWLRQ´GLIIHUVIURP
.LHUNHJDDUG¶V: whereas the latter was fighting against the reduction of Christianity to 
&KULVWHQGRPDQGVRVRXJKWWRPDNHWKHUHOLJLRXVUHODWLRQDPDWWHURI³LQZDUGQHVV´DQG
decisive existential importance to the individual, Luther was trying to make Christianity less 
a matter of individual works and so he emphasizes its social dimension (ibid.). As a result, 
the tendencies in their respective conceptions pull in opposite directions. But secondly, and 
more broadly, Løgstrup argues that Luther is happier than Kierkegaard to see life in the finite 
world as structured by God into ethical relationships. For Kierkegaard, ³ILQLWXGHLVOHYHOOHG
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RXWWRQRWKLQJEXWUHODWLYHHQGVDQGQRWKLQJEXWLPPDQHQFH´KAV 268), with a 
corresponding loss of significance to our social relations in which he can therefore see no 
SODFHIRUGLYLQHDXWKRULW\EXWRQO\DQLQDXWKHQWLF³OLIHLQWKHFURZG´%\FRQWUDVWIRU/XWKHU, 
³In finitude, God places his demand on the individual, God contradicts the egoism of the 
individual through the neighbor that he forces on the individual by ordering life in finitude 
LQWRDOLIHLQRIILFHV´ibid.). It is this issue that Løgstrup carries forward into his later work, 
where he continues to conWUDVW/XWKHU¶VSRVLWLRQZLWK.LHUNHJDDUG¶VDQG.DQW¶V27 Løgstrup 
suggests that in distinguishing between absolute and relative goals or ends and rejecting any 
mediation between them, Kierkegaard denudes the finite world of human needs and relations 
of an\JHQXLQHYDOXHDQGVLJQLILFDQFHLQLWVRZQULJKWE\UHGXFLQJLWWRD3ODWRQLF³realm of 
shadows´28 thereby preventing it from containing the kind of normative structures that 
Luther recognized (KAV 268±9). Thus, HYHQZKHQ/¡JVWUXSPRYHVDZD\IURP/XWKHU¶V 
specific conception of social orders as providing us with these structures and instead takes 
our ethical relations to arise out of our more basic interdependence that is then refracted in 
VRFLDOQRUPVKHVWLOOVHHVWKLVDVIXQGDPHQWDOO\FORVHUWR/XWKHU¶s conception of the finite 
world than that of Kierkegaard,29 which he thinks is always in danger of becoming a kind of 
ethical nihilism and other-worldliness. At the heart of this article, therefore, lies a 
                                                     
27
 )RUIXUWKHUGLVFXVVLRQRIKRZ/¡JVWUXS¶VFULWLTXHRI.LHUNHJDDUGUHODWHVWRKLVSDUDOOHO
critique of Kant, and of his critique of Kierkegaard more generally, see Robert Stern, 
³&RQIURQWLQJ.DQWDQG.LHUNHJDDUG´FKDSRI7KH5DGLFDO'HPDQGLQ/¡JVWUXS¶V(WKLFV 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 202±46.  
28
 Løgstrup, Opgør med Kierkegaard, p. 159; our trans. Løgstrup writes the following: 
³3ODWRQLVP¶VVSHFXODWLYHGHYDOXLQJRIWKLVZRUOGWKDWLWODcks reality, that it is a realm of 
shadows [skyggerige@UHFXUVLQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI&KULVWLDQLW\DVDQLPSOLFLW
claim that the empirical is not first rendered mediocre by the mediocrity of human beings, but 
is made so already by the hand of the creator´ibid.). )RUIXUWKHUFRPPHQWVRQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶V
relation to Plato, see also pp. 133±9, where Løgstrup makes clear that he does not share 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ. In particular, consider the following remark: ³Hegel makes the 
absolute immanent, while the transcendent [hinsidigheden] in Socrates and Plato remains 
transcendent²RQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHP´ (p. 133). 
29
 For example, Løgstrup claims that ³the ethical demand receives its content from the 
fundamental condition that we live under and that we are not in a position to change, namely 
that the life of one person is entangled with that of the other person, and so it consists in 
taking care of the paUWRIWKHRWKHUSHUVRQ¶s life which as a result of this entanglement is at 
our mercy. µNature (understood as the immutable fundamental conditions) teaches what love 
does¶ (Luther). The ethical demand is refracted as through prisms of all the different and 
particular relationships in which we stand to one another as spouses, parents and children, 
teachers and students, employers and workers, as they are all forms of the fundamental 
condition whereby the ethical demand receives its content´.(/¡JVWUXS Etiske begreber 
og problemer [Aarhus: Klim, 2014], p. 12; our trans.). 
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fundamental disagreement between Løgstrup and Kierkegaard that was to be developed 
through the engagement with Kierkegaard that was still to come, as Løgstrup continued to 
distance himself from Kierkegaard and contemporary Kierkegaardians on these central issues 
in elaborating his own position. 
 
4. Løgstrup contra Kierkegaard 
:HKDYHQRZVHHQKRZ/¡JVWUXS¶VSDSHUUDLVHVWZRIXQGDPHQWDOREMHFWLRQVWR.LHUNHJDDUG
First, Løgstrup claims that .LHUNHJDDUG¶V strategy of indirect communication is in fact 
uncalled for, as it attempts to address a problem that does not really arise. Second, Løgstrup 
offers a diagnostic suggestion, arguing that Kierkegaard fails to see this due to wider 
GLIILFXOWLHVLQKLVRXWORRNVWHPPLQJIURPKLV³OHYHOOLQJRXW´RIWKHILQLWHDQGWKHXQGHUO\LQJ
nihilism about the finite that this implies. In this section, we will consider how Kierkegaard 
might respond to these objections.  
 On the first issue, there can be little doubt that the question of authority does concern 
Kierkegaard. In particular, his own authority as an author creates difficulties for him in his 
attempt to communicate significant subjective truths to his readership.30 Moreover, 
Kierkegaard explicitly relates this issue to his lack of authority as a preacher, claiming that he 
cannot communicate directly to his audience as one who issues a proclamation might.31 In 
this respect, Løgstrup clearly has a legitimate target for his criticism. 
                                                     
30
 &RQVLGHUIRUH[DPSOH.LHUNHJDDUG¶VUHPDUNWKDW ³µWithout authority¶WRPDNHDZDUHRI
the religious, the essentially Christian, is the category for my whole work as an author 
regarded as a totality. From the very beginning I have enjoined and repeated unchanged that I 
ZDVµZLWKRXWDXWKRULW\¶,UHJDUG myself rather as a reader of the books, not as the author´ 
(6¡UHQ.LHUNHJDDUG³7KH$FFRXQWLQJ´LQThe Point of View, trans. Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong, vol. 22 of .LHUNHJDDUG¶V:ULWLQJV, trans. Howard V. Hong et al., ed. Howard 
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998], p. 12; Om min 
Forfatter-Virksomhed, SKS: XIII 19). See also the preface to For Self-Examination, where 
.LHUNHJDDUGUHFRPPHQGVWKHERRNEHUHDGDORXGVD\LQJWKDW³%\UHDGLQJDORXG\RXZLOO
gain the strongest impression that you have only yourself to consider, not me, who, after all, 
DPµZLWKRXWDXWKRULW\¶´For Self-Examination/Judge for Yourself!, trans. and ed. Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong, vol. 21 of Kierkegaard's Writings, trans. Howard V. Hong et al., 
ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990], p. 
3/Til Selvprøvelse, SKS XIII: 33; see also pp. 17 and 21±2/SKS XIII: 46 and 50±51). This 
SRLQWLVPDGHIUHTXHQWO\LQWKHSUHIDFHVWR.LHUNHJDDUG¶VZRUNVIRUVRPHIurther references, 
see the Hongs¶ note to For Self-Examination (p. 271n. 3).  
31
 In the preface to Two Upbuilding Discourses, Kierkegaard notes that this ³OLWWOHERRk . . . is 
FDOOHGµGLVFRXUVHV¶QRWVHUPRQVEHFDXVHLWVDXWKRUGRHVQRWKDYHDXWKRULW\WRpreach´ (Søren 
Kierkegaard, preface to Two Upbuilding Discourses, in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 
trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, vol. 5 of .LHUNHJDDUG¶V:ULWLQJV, trans. 
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 However, in fairness to Kierkegaard, it could be argued that while this is undoubtedly 
one source of his concern, and thus one source of his argument for indirect communication, it 
is not the only one, and perhaps not even the most important, which would mean that 
Løgstrup has failed to properly address the issue as a whole. .LHUNHJDDUG¶VHPSKDVLVRQWKH
need for such communication has other grounds on which it can be defended that Løgstrup 
GRHVQRWGHDOZLWKDWDOO)RUH[DPSOHLQWKHUDWKHUH[WHQVLYHOLWHUDWXUHRQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶V
YLHZRILQGLUHFWFRPPXQLFDWLRQEDVHGSULPDULO\RQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VFRPPHQWVLQKLVZork The 
Point of View for My Work as an Author, it is argued that an important rationale for indirect 
communication comes not from any concern about authority but rather from a concern about 
KRZWRHQDEOHSHRSOHWRHVFDSHIURPWKH³HQRUPRXV´>uhyre] or ³GUHDGIXOLOOXVLRQ´>fryteligt 
Sandsebedrag] of Christendom²that people are Christian simply by being born in a 
Christian country², which inspires Kierkegaard to write WKDW³DQLOOXVLRQFDQQHYHUEH
removed directly, and basically only indirectly. If it is an illusion that all are Christians, and if 
VRPHWKLQJLVWREHGRQHLWPXVWEHGRQHLQGLUHFWO\´32 He continues: 
On the assumption, then, that a religious author has from the ground up become aware 
of this illusion, Christendom, and to the limit of his ability with, note well, the help of 
God, wants to stamp it out²what is he to do then? Well, first and foremost, no 
impatience. If he becomes impatient, then he makes a direct assault and 
accomplishes²nothing. By a direct attack he only strengthens a person in the illusion 
and also infuriates him.33 
Instead, Kierkegaard argues, an indirect approach is required, involving the use of deception 
DVD³FRUURVLYH´VRWKDWWKHDXGLHQFHZLOOQRWEHDZDUHRIZKDWLVRFFXUULQJDQGVRZLOOQRWEH
able to shut out what is being said.34 This indirectness is a deception because, instead of 
saying what one thinks²that one is a Christian and the other is not², one begins by 
pretending that one believes the opposite.35 
                                                     
Howard V. Hong et al., ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong [Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990], p. 5/To opbyggelige Taler, SKS V: 183). 
32
 Søren Kierkegaard, The Point of View for My Work as an Author, in The Point of View, p. 
43; Synspunktet for min Forfatter-Virksomhed, SKS XVI: 25. 
33
 Ibid/SKS XVI: 25±6. 
34
 Ibid, pp. 53±4/SKS XVI: 35. 
35
 For further discussion of this approach, see Genia Schönbaumsfeld, A Confusion of the 
Spheres: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Religion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 40±1; and AntRQ\$XPDQQ³.LHUNHJDDUGRQ,QGLUHFW
&RPPXQLFDWLRQWKH&URZGDQGD0RQVWURXV,OOXVLRQ´LQInternational Kierkegaard 
Commentary: Point of View, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 
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 Now, it would be fair to say that this set of issues does raise questions distinct from 
WKRVHDGGUHVVHGE\/¡JVWUXSDQGWKDWWKHODWWHU¶VFULWLFLVPVRI.LHUNHJDDUG¶VDXWKRULW\-based 
DUJXPHQWIRULQGLUHFWFRPPXQLFDWLRQPD\QRWDSSO\WRWKLVDUJXPHQWIURP³HQRUPRXV
LOOXVLRQ´0RUHRYHULWZRXOGDSSHDUWKDW/¡JVWUXS nowhere tackles this second argument for 
indirectness. But, of course, WKDWGRHVQRWLQLWVHOIXQGHUPLQH/¡JVWUXS¶VFULWLFLVPVRIWKH
authority-based argument or show that he needs to deal with this second argument, since for 
him this second argument would not appear to connect to the deeper issues that really 
concern him with the authority-based argument, namely what this tells us about 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VXQGHUO\LQJQLKLOLVP,WLVWKXVWRWKLVVHFRQGLVVXHWKDWZHFDQQRZEULHIO\WXUQ 
 +HUH/¡JVWUXS¶VFriticism of Kierkegaard is likely to irritate the contemporary 
Kierkegaardian36²although, as we have seen, in the context of the Kierkegaardianism of his 
RZQGD\/¡JVWUXS¶VUHDGLQJRI.LHUNHJDDUGDVDQLKLOLVWZDVJHQHUDOO\DFFHSWHGDVWKHULJKW
one by readers in the Tidehverv circle such as Olesen Larsen and others, so to this extent it 
would seem unfair to condemn Løgstrup for his approach. Nonetheless, it might seem to 
PDNH/¡JVWUXS¶VFULWLFLVPOHVVUHOHYDQt within current debates. 
 However, there are twRSRVVLEOHUHVSRQVHVWRWKLVFRQFHUQ)LUVWZKLOH/¡JVWUXS¶V
criticism of Kierkegaard is certainly polemical, and therefore often unsubtle and at times 
uncharitable, it may be harder to dismiss than some Kierkegaardians have claimed²though it 
is not possible to go into the details of this here.37 6HFRQGHYHQLI/¡JVWUXS¶VFODLP
FRQFHUQLQJ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VQLKLOLVPLQWKHHQGSURYHVXQIRXQGHGWKLVFODLPZDVGHYHORSHGDV
ZHKDYHVHHQDVDGLDJQRVWLFSRLQWFRQFHUQLQJ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRWKHDUJXPHQW
from authority and why Kierkegaard felt compelled to make it and found it so compelling. 
(YHQLIWKLVGLDJQRVWLFSRLQWZHUHWREHRYHUWXUQHGWKHUHIRUHLWZRXOGVWLOOOHDYH/¡JVWUXS¶V
criticism of that argument intact²and as this is an original criticism of that argument (as far 
DVZHFDQWHOOLQWHUHVWLQ/¡JVWUXS¶VSRVLWLRQVWLOOUHPDLQVIXOO\ZDUUDQWHG 
 Finally, it could be argued against Løgstrup that these two Kierkegaardian arguments 
for indirect communication²the argument from authority and the argument from removing 
                                                     
2010), pp. 295±$XPDQQ¶VDUWLFOHFRQWDLQVPDQ\UHIHUHQFHVWRWKHVHFRQGDU\OLWHUDWXUHRQ
Kierkegaard and indirect communication. 
36
 Indeed, it has done so: see, for example, Jamie M. Ferreira, /RYH¶V*UDWHIXO6WULYLQJ$
&RPPHQWDU\RQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VWorks of Love (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 
76±82; and Robert Zachary Manis, ³Kierkegaard,´ in The Cambridge History of Moral 
Philosophy, ed. Sacha Golob and Jens Timmermann (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017), pp. 459±71, esp. 469. 
37
 )RUIXUWKHUGLVFXVVLRQVHH6WHUQ³&onfronting Kant and Kierkegaard´; and also Rabjerg, 
Løgstrup og Kierkegaard. 
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illusion²are more closely connected than Løgstrup sees, as the second can be used to 
reinforce the first. For example, in For Self-Examination, Kierkegaard argues that the illusion 
will only be removed if we are forced to see ourselves IRUZKDWZHDUHLQWKH³PLUURU´RI
*RG¶V:RUGWRXVZKLFKZLOORQO\ZRUNLQWKLVZD\DVDPLUURULIZHWDNHWKDW:RUGWREH
addressed to each of us as individuals rather than as some objective truth,38 so that, for 
example, we think of ourselves as being in the situation of the Priest, the Levite, or the Good 
Samaritan when the parable is recounted to us.39 Thus, Kierkegaard could argue against 
Løgstrup as follows: either the audience needs to see the parable as addressed to them 
individually in a second-personal manner that does involve some sort of authority; or (if we 
lack the requisite authority, as Kierkegaard does, for who is he to hold up this mirror to the 
audience in this way and judge them?) indirect communication is required in order to prevent 
what is being discussed from becoming a merely objective matter that fails to engage the 
audience as individuals at all.40 The claim here is therefore that in order for the mirror to 
work in dispelling our illusions, it must draw us to see our own faces in the glass, which 
requires authority; if such authority is lacking, indirect communication would then remain as 
the only available option to a writer like Kierkegaard.41  
                                                     
38
 For example, Kierkegaard claims, ³:KHQ\RXUHDG*RG¶V:RUGLQHYHU\WKLQJ\RXUHDG
continually to say to yourself: It is I to whom it is speaking, it is I about whom it is 
speaking²this is earnestness, precisely this is earnestness. Not a single one of those to whom 
the cause of Christianity in the higher sense has been entrusted forgot to urge this again and 
again as most crucial, as unconditionally the condition if you are to come to see yourself in 
the mirror. Consequently, this is what you have to do; while you are reading you must 
incessantly say to yourself: It is I to whom it is speaking, it is I about whom it is speaking´ 
(For Self-Examination, pp. 36±7/SKS XIII: 63). 
39
 See ibid., pp. 40±41/SKS XIII: 66±7. 
40
 For example, he writes, ³2KZKDWGHSWKRIFXQQLQJ2QHPDNHV*RG¶V:RUGLQWR
something impersonal, objective, a doctrine²instead of its being the voice of God that you 
shall hear. This is the way the fathers heard it, this terrifying voice of God; now it sounds as 
objective as calico! And one relates impersonally (objectively) to this impersonal thing´ 
(ibid., p. 39/SKS XIII: 66). 
41
 This point has been noted by Jamie Lorentzen, .LHUNHJDDUG¶V0HWDSKRUV(Macon, GA: 
Mercer University Press, 2001), pp. 111±2, and further developed in relation to 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHPLUURUE\3DWULFN6WRNHVLQKLV.LHUNHJDDUG¶V0LUURUV
Interest, Self, and Moral Vision (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 129±30. 
/RUHQW]HQZULWHV³7KURXJKRXWKLVDXWKRUVKLS.LHUNHJDDUGFRQWLQXDOO\ intimates to the 
reader that the content of his work is for the reader because the subject of his thought is the 
reader. . . . And although a direct communicative approach by the author may let readers 
more easily know in what respect they are being addressed, Kierkegaard seldom break from 
his Socratic fidelity with the reader by assuming such an authorial or dogmatic stance evoked 
by direct communication. Instead, he continually seeks out new ways to prompt the reader 
into self-awareness . . . More often than not, metaphor plays a significant role, not only in 
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 Interestingly, then, what this debate with Løgstrup reveals is that the key issue 
regarding indirect communication may turn out not to be the Socratic problem of how one 
communicates a decisive truth to a person while leaving them to think for themselves (which 
is how it is often portrayed, not least by Kierkegaard himself), but how, without some 
exercise of authority, one gets them to feel that communication in a second-personal manner, 
as an address to them as individuals, for it is only when taken up at this level that the illusion 
under which they are operating can be dispelled. If one has the authority to proclaim to a 
person, this can be achieved directly, as in the case of proclaiming the Gospel;42 but if (like 
Kierkegaard) one does not have authority to speak to others in this manner, then in order for 
the subject of the address to recognize that they are indeed being addressed individually in 
this way, a more indirect approach is required.43 
 
5. Proclamation as Normative Power 
Having reviewed the debate between Løgstrup and Kierkegaard, we now turn to relating 
/¡JVWUXS¶VFRQFHUQVWRGHYHORSPHQWVLQFRQWHPSRUDU\SKLORVRSK\DQGWU\WRJDLQDEHWWHU
understanding of his position on the nature and status of proclamation. In his article, Løgstrup 
does not give us an explicit and comprehensive account of what this nature and status is or 
the kind of authority that it involves. He identifies it as a kind of speech act and puts it in the 
category of address alongside ³WKHTXHVWLRQWKHFRPPDQGWKHUHTXHVWWKHSURPLVHDQGVR
RQ´.$9²but beyond this, does not specify in any detail what kind of speech act it is. 
In the remainder of this paper we take up this question and consider the normative power of 
                                                     
FRPPXQLFDWLQJDVVHUWLRQVEXWDOVRLQXSKROGLQJKLVDUWRILQGLUHFWFRPPXQLFDWLRQ´
(.LHUNHJDDUG¶V0HWDSKRUV, p. 111). 
42
 In Works of Love, Kierkegaard writes the following: ³7KH*RVSHOGRHVQRWQHHGWRDGG
ZKDWWKHSURSKHW1DWKDQDGGHGWRKLVSDUDEOHµ<RXDUHWKHPDQ¶VLQFHLWLVDOUHDG\FRQWDLQHG
in the form of the statement and in its being a word of the Gospel. The divine authority of the 
Gospel does not speak to one person about another, does not speak to you, my listener, about 
me, or to me about you²no, when the Gospel speaks, it speaks to the single individual. It 
does not speak about us human beings, you and me, but speaks to us human beings, to you 
DQGPH´ (Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love: Some Christian Deliberations in the Form of 
Discourses, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, vol. 16 of .LHUNHJDDUG¶V:ULWLQJV, 
trans. Howard V. Hong et al., ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong [Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993], p. 14/Kjerlighedens Gjerninger, SKS IX: 22). 
43
 )RUDQDPXVLQJH[DPSOHRIKRZWKLVLQGLUHFWQHVVPLJKWZRUNVHH+XJK3\SHU¶V
.LHUNHJDDUGLDQXVHRIRQHRI1HLO0XQUR¶VVWRUies ³The Malingerer´ (in Para Handy and 
Other Tales [Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1948], pp. 10±3) in Hugh Pyper, The 
Joy of Kierkegaard: Essays on Kierkegaard as a Biblical Reader (Chesham: Acumen, 2011), 
pp. 41±2. 
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proclamation qua performative. Our suggestion will be that this power varies depending on 
what is proclaimed, and we will illustrate this with three key examples that differ in how the 
relation between the speaker and the audience plays out.44 These three examples are: 
proclamations about the objective facts; proclamations that issue demands for subjective 
reflection; and proclamations that bring about forgiveness. We start with a brief account of 
normative power before turning to look at each of these three types in more detail. 
First of all, let us look at how performatives, like orders or promises, operate to 
change the normative situation or relation between two or more agents and how they require 
authority or standing.45 Take the case of an order. If valid, an order brings about a normative 
change, since in issuing the order the bearer of authority creates a new obligation for the 
subject. The normative change is brought about by performance insofar as it is an expression 
of will (or an expression of intention) that creates the obligation. Furthermore, it creates a 
specific kind of obligation that we can call directed or bipolar. It is not simply that it is a 
good idea for the subject to behave in a certain way but rather that there is now an obligation 
that the subject owes to the bearer of authority. The subject X owes it to bearer of authority Y 
to do some action A; and by the same token, Y has a right, as a result of the order, that X 
should do A. However, as well as creating a new obligation, a valid order also has an effect 
on the reasons that would have applied to the subject had the order not been given. /HW¶VVay 
WKHRUGHULV³$WWDFNIURPWKHULJKW´7KHUHPD\EHYDULRXVUHDVRQVLQIDYRURIDFWLRQVRWKHU
than attacking from the right²there might be something to be said for not attacking at all, or 
attacking from the left, or splitting up and attacking in pincer formation, etc.²but the effect 
RIWKHRUGHULVWRWDNHDZD\WKHVXEMHFW¶VULJKWWRDFWRQWKRVHFRQVLGHUDWLRQV7KHSUDFWLFDO
force of the reasons that conflict with the order is excluded or silenced. This silencing of 
competing considerations is not absolute, since if the order is sufficiently misguided it can no 
longer be binding. But if orders can be valid then at least sometimes they must be successful 
LQUHSODFLQJWKHVXEMHFW¶VGHFLsion-making with the decision made by the superior. In those 
cases, the order is binding because the subject no longer has the right to make the decision for 
                                                     
44
 Another obvious example which we will not consider is a proclamation that issues in a 
command. This is not so relevant to our discussion here, given that (as we have seen) 
Løgstrup has concerns over the sort of divine command theory that this would entail. 
45
 For more on normative powers, see Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (London: 
Hutchinson, 19*DU\:DWVRQ³3URPLVHV5HDVRQVDQG1RUPDWLYH3RZHUV´LQReasons 
for Action, ed. David J. Sobel and Steven Wall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), pp. 155±78; and David Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). For more on the question of authority see Joseph Raz, Practical 
Reason and Norms and The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
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themselves. The reason for which a valid order is binding is therefore not that the action A is 
the most sensible option of the available alternatives. Although it must not be too misguided, 
a valid order can be binding independently of being optimal. Therefore, an important part of 
explaining its force must refer not to the content of the order, and how sensible it is, but 
rather its source or the position or authority of the person to make it: it has to refer to the 
right of that person to make such decisions and to their having a certain jurisdiction.  
To show that Løgstrup thinks of proclamation as the exercise of a normative power, 
UHWXUQWR/¡JVWUXS¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQSURFODPDWLRQDQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQZKLFKKHGUDZV
along four axes. First, proclamation is second-personally addressed,WLV³DFDWHJRU\RI
address. That means: what is proclaimed to DKXPDQEHLQJFRPHVLQWRIRUFHIRUWKHP´
ZKHUHDVZKDWLVFRPPXQLFDWHG³VLPSO\DVFRPPXQLFDWHG²leaves the life of human being 
FRPSOHWHO\XQWRXFKHG´.$96HFRQGDQGDVREVHUYHGDERYHproclamation is a 
performative speech act,WLVOLNH³WKHFRPPDQG, the request, the promise and so on . . . [in] 
that the content does not exist as something given outside the corresponding category [of 
DGGUHVV@´.$9%\FRQWUDVWZLWKUHVSHFWWRFRPPXQLFDWLRQ³one disregards the 
category, in order to stress explicitly that one comes to know something; this is what the 
objectivity of the category consists in´.$97KLUGproclamation presupposes 
authority,W³SUHVXSSRVHVsome authority that establishes the validity of that which is 
SURFODLPHG´.$92Q WKHRWKHUKDQG³&RPPXQLFDWLRQLVQRWJURXQGHGRUVXSSRUWHG
through something else that stands behind it; rather the relation between the informant and 
UHFLSLHQWLVH[KDXVWHGLQWKHPHVVDJH´.$9)RXUWKproclamation changes the second-
personal communicative relation. For example,  
If what is proclaimed is something good for the recipient, then the authority relation 
can be further characterized as either one of trust or mistrust, depending on how what 
is proclaimed is accepted. If the proclamation has threatening content, then the 
manner of its reception gives the relationship of authority the further characteristic of 
either obedience or rebellion. (KAV 249±50) 
By contrast, communication ³does not change anything in the relationship between the 
informant and the UHFLSLHQWDVVXFK´.$9  
 
5.1 Proclamation as Testimony 
Having outlined the basic conception of normative powers and shown how it can be related to 
/¡JVWUXS¶VSRVLWLRQZHQRZFRQVLGHUZKDWIRUPRIVXFKSRZHULVGHSOR\HGLQWKHFDVHRI
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proclamation. We will suggest that the answer to this depends on what is being proclaimed. 
Let us start by looking at proclamation about facts, as a form of testimony.  
To see how testimony might count as a form of proclamation, by involving the kind 
of authority the latter requires, recall that the distinction between proclamation and 
communication with which Løgstrup began is a distinction between two different ways of 
receiving the Word of God. In communication, the audience is given evidence for belief, but 
LQSURFODPDWLRQWKHVSHDNHU¶VDXWKRULW\LVLQVRPHZD\FUXFLDO$VVXFK, the distinction 
between proclamation and communication could be understood as an epistemological 
distinction. Conceived epistemologically, the set of contrasts Løgstrup maps out above lines 
up with two different contemporary epistemologies of testimony. When a speaker performs 
the speech act of telling an audience something, on one account this speech act operates as an 
assuranceZKHUHWKHVSHDNHU¶VDXWKRULW\LVFUXFLDODQGRQWKHRWKHUDFFRXQWWKLVVSHHFKDFW
is treated as a piece of evidence, and the audience maintains their autonomy. This distinction 
between assurance and evidentialist approaches to the speech act of telling then generates the 
same set of contrasts that Løgstrup describes.  
First, conceived as assurance, telling is second-personally addressed. The speech act 
of telling is one where a speaker S addresses an audience A; and in telling A that p, the 
speaker S thereby purports to give A unique reason to believe that p, namely the reason that 
FRPHVIURPVHHLQJ6¶VLQWHQWLRQWKDW$EHOLHYHthat p as an assumption of responsibility for A 
believing truly that p. Thus, Richard Moran argues that telling is like promising because it 
RIIHUVWKHVSHDNHU¶VDVVXUDQFHWKDWZKDWLVWROGLVWUXH46 By contrast, conceived as evidence, a 
telling is just one more piece of behavior and no more second-personally addressed than the 
VSHDNHU¶VZHDULQJFHUWDLQFORWKHVRUKDYLQJDFHUWDLQDFFHQW6HFRQGtelling is a performative 
speech act, again at least when conceived as assurance. Performatives are speech acts whose 
very utterance does something, and one signal that such an act has occurred is the 
DSSOLFDELOLW\RI³KHUHE\´)RUH[DPSOHZKHQSURPLVLQJLWLVDSSURSULDWHWRXVH³KHUHE\´DV
LQ³,KHUHE\SURPLVH\RXWR´$QGWKHVDPHLVWUXHRIWKHVSHHFK act of telling: it is 
DSSURSULDWHWRVD\³,KHUHE\WHOO\RXWKDW´5HPRYHWKHFDWHJRU\RIDGGUHVV²suppose, 
for example, that the promise or telling were mere words uttered while asleep²and, as 
                                                     
46
 5LFKDUG0RUDQ³*HWWLQJ7ROGDQG%HLQJ%HOLHYHG´3KLORVRSKHUV¶ Imprint 5:5 (2005), pp. 
1±29. See also Benjamin McMyler, Testimony, Trust and Authority (Oxford: Oxford 
8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV(GZDUG+LQFKPDQ³7HOOLQJDV,QYLWLQJWR7UXVW´Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 70:3 (2005), pp. 562±87; and Paul Faulkner, ³2Q7HOOLQJDQG
7UXVWLQJ´Mind 116:464 (2007), pp. 875±902.  
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Løgstrup observes, there is no promise made and nothing is told (KAV 249). By contrast, 
conceived as evidence, there is no difference between a speech act that is intentionally made 
and words uttered in sleep; both are evidence for something. Third, telling presupposes 
authority, again at least when conceived as assurance. We can make promises we are not in a 
position to keep and tell people things we do not know. But these speech acts are false or 
infelicitousLQ$XVWLQ¶VWHUP.47 In telling A that p, S purports to assume responsibility for A 
believing truly, and S can properly assume this responsibility if and only if S has grounds for 
thinking that p is true²ideally grounds that allow S to know that p. Thus, in telling A that p, 
6SXUSRUWVWRKDYHWKHVHJURXQGVDQG6¶VWHOOLQJSUHVXSSRVHVWKLVDXWKRULW\%y contrast, 
telling is evidence for something if and only if it is combined with further belief that indicates 
what it is evidence for and why it is evidence for this thing. The authority then lies with this 
further background. Remove this background and the telling is, as Løgstrup says, no more 
than message (ibid.). Fourth, telling changes the second-personal communicative relation 
when conceived as assurance because viewed this way, it is an invitation to trust.48 So if the 
telling is not received with trust, it is liable to provoke resentment in the speaker. Equally, if 
the audience responds to the telling with trust and is then misled, either intentionally or 
through some failure to assume responsibility adequately, the audience is liable to 
resentment. The telling thereby changes the speaker-audience relation. By contrast, conceived 
as evidence, nothing is demanded of the speaker, and nothing is risked by the audience. 
The distinction between proclamation and communication thus maps onto the 
distinction between conceiving of testimony as assurance and conceiving of it as evidence. 
Having made this distinction and focusing on proclamation²or a speech act of telling that is 
conceived as assurance²Løgstrup then draws a very natural distinction. There are cases in 
which the speaker is the original authority and cases in which the speaker has derived 
authority (KAV 263). For example, suppose that you ask me what the weather is like outside. 
I get up, look, and tell you. In this case, my authority is original: I know what the weather is 
like by looking, and you know by my telling you. Or suppose you have proved a theorem that 
I am struggling with. You indicate a certain point in my workings where I go wrong and tell 
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 J. L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). 
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 7KHLPSRUWDQFHRIWUXVWLVDFHQWUDOWKHPHLQ/¡JVWUXS¶VZRUNVHHIRUH[DPSOH
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237±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me to do something else. In this case, your authority is original: you know through possessing 
and understanding the proof; and I know, at this point, only by your telling me. In many 
testimonial exchanges, we tell people things that we know first-hand, when we are the 
original authorities. But we also tell people things that we only know by testimony ourselves. 
This is then one way in which a speaker can be a derived authority, and Løgstrup suggests 
there are two cases here. There are cases in which the speaker is a derived authority because 
authority is inherited; and there are cases in which the speaker is a derived authority because 
the speaker is merely a spokesperson for authority. The first of the cases is when the speaker 
tells an audience something that is not known first-hand but itself known through testimony. 
From the epistemological perspective this difference between original and inherited authority 
changes little: if testimony can transmit knowledge across one communicative link, this can 
be iterated. Provided that a speaker can assume responsibility for the truth of what they know, 
it does not matter whether this knowledge is first-hand or testimonial. 
7KHLQWHUHVWLQJFDVHLVZKHQWKHVSHDNHU¶VDXWKRULW\LVGHULYHGEHFDXVHWKHVSHDNHULV
merely a spokesperson for authority. This is the case in which the apostles proclaim the Word 
of God or when the proclaimer is within the Church. In both cases, the authority of the 
VSHDNHUFRPHVZLWKWKH³SRVVHVVLRQRIDQRIILFH´.$97KXV/¡JVWUXSREVHUYHV³7KH
category of proclamation therefore cannot in any way be analyzed without the office of the 
SURFODPDWLRQEHLQJEURXJKWLQWRWKHSLFWXUH´LELG7KLVLGHDWKDWDXWKRULW\PLJKWEH
grounded in office is, we suggest, the idea that the authority that grounds a felicitous act of 
telling might be neither original nor inherited²it might not be an authority that the speaker 
possesses, but might come from the speaker being an official spokesperson of an authority.  
A contemporary example of this can be found in the case of collective knowledge. 
Some things we can only know collectively. This is because the evidence required to know 
some things first-hand can only be assembled through collective endeavor. Much 
contemporary scientific work is like this because experiments are often too complex to be 
done individually. For example, John Hardwig cites an early experiment to measure the life-
span of Charm particles where 280 person-years were required to build the experimental 
equipment, gather, and analyze the data.49 The resulting paper stating the experimental results 
in the Physical Review Letters cited ninety-nine authors.50 2UFRQVLGHU/DFNH\¶VFDVHRID
report charting the progress of populations in forty-seven states, commissioned by and 
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presented to the United Nations Population Commission.51 The vast amount of data and 
statistical analysis needed to identify population level trends in forty-seven countries again 
makes this report the product of collective endeavor. As Lackey imagines the case, the report 
is presented to the United Nations Population Commission by a spokesperson, Sam, who 
³LQWHUSUHWVDQGFRPSLOHVDOORIWKHGDWDFRQWULEXWHGLQWRWKHSXEOLVKHGUHSRUW´52 This 
would be a substantial contribution, and for this reason, Sam could be regarded as an original 
authority²one who knows the various strands the report pulls together on the basis of 
testimony. However, the kind of spokesperson we should imagine is not one who plays any 
contributory role but rather one who is merely a spokesperson. Were Sam merely a 
spokesperson, when she tells the assembled United Nations Population Commission that p²
say that the birth-rate of Latinos is on the rise in the United States²she would be merely 
YRFDOL]LQJZKDWKDVEHHQZULWWHQLQWKHUHSRUW$VVXFKZKLOH6DP¶VWestimony allows the 
assembled members of the Commission to know that p, this is not because Sam is an original 
authority²nor is it because she is an inherited authority, though she is this², but it is 
because her testimonial authority derives from that fact that she speaks for, and so with the 
authority of, the United Nations Population Commission. 
&RQVLGHUQRZWKHDXGLHQFH¶VSHUVSHFWLYH2QWKHDVVXUDQFHYLHZWKHVSHHFKDFWRI
telling invites trust and so belief. Belief will then be rational to the extent that trust is rational, 
or to the extent that the audience otherwise believes that the speaker is in a position to 
discharge the responsibility that they assume (i.e., to the extent that the audience believes the 
speaker to have the requisite authority). Given that testimonial authority can be grounded in 
these ways, this means that a speaker has authority to the extent that either the audience 
believes that the speaker is an authority (original or inherited), or the audience believes that 
the speaker has the authority of an office that has authority. In the contemporary case just 
given, this judgment is straightforward, so there need be no issue with the rationality of trust. 
That is, it would be simple to conclude both that Sam speaks for the United Nations 
Population Commission and that she has the authority of the United Nations Population 
Commission. In the case of religious proclamation, the parallel of this last judgment is far 
from straightforward. 
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Indeed, there is something of a puzzle to religious proclamation when it comes to 
considering proclamation as a vehicle for conversion.53 To outline this, suppose that the 
audience already believes in the Word of God. Then the audience will recognize both the 
office of the proclaimer and the authority behind it. It follows that it will be rational for this 
audience to believe the proclamation. But the concern here is proclamation to the 
unconverted. Suppose, then, that the audience is a non-believer. In this case, irrespective of 
whether the audience recognizes the office of the proclaimer, the audience will not recognize 
any authority behind this office. It follows that there is no rational path to believe the 
SURFODPDWLRQWKDWVWDUWVIURPWKHDXGLHQFH¶VEHOLHIDORQH7KXVWKHUHUHPDLQVWKHTXHVWLRQRI
whether trust in the proclamation is possible and can be rational. The debate here is rather 
complex, but in order for this avenue to be open, it needs to be argued that the rationality of 
trust does not reduce to that of belief and that trust can be rational in its own terms.54 But 
even if this is accepted, any trust-based uptake of the proclamation still involves presuming 
that the speaker has the authority that they purport to have. This presumption would be 
rejected if non-belief amounts to a rejection of the Word of God. It follows that there can be 
no rationality in trusting the proclamation when non-belief amounts to such rejection. But 
then, short of a miracle, there can be no rational conversion for atheists and others who start 
from a rejection of the Word of God. The puzzle is then that proclamation only really speaks 
to those who already converted. 
 
5.2 Proclamation as Appeal 
In the previous sub-section, we explained how proclamation might be understood as a kind of 
testimony that involves authority because it purports to offer some kind of personal 
assurance. On the assurance account, telling should be understood as a performative like 
ordering or promising. In focusing on proclamation as testimony, we have argued that the 
normative power for both is that of giving an audience a reason for belief. However, not all 
proclamations are about facts; proclamation can also be a practical normative power, a power 
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to create reasons for doing something. For example, proclamation can be the normative 
power of appeal.  
To see how appeals might relate to proclamation, take the parallel case of a request.55 
If I request that you lend me your book for half an hour to help with the writing of my essay, 
I do not put you under an obligation to lend me your book. Requests differ from orders in that 
they leave the person free, normatively speaking, to decide whether or not to accede to the 
request. However, this is not to say that the request does not place the recipient under any 
obligation at all. The recipient is under an obligation, simply by being requested, to respond 
in some way. The person making the request has a certain authority or standing to make a 
request. That standing has to be recognized or acknowledged by giving the request some 
response, even if the response is only a negative one. Simply to ignore the request would be 
to wrong the requester because it denigrates them: it would treat them as if they had no right 
to make the request in the first place. Thus, the request places the recipient under an 
obligation to respond, and the requester can do this because they have the authority or 
standing to make a request of someone. Furthermore, this obligation to respond is one that is 
directed²meaning that the response is owed to the requester by the recipient², and it is 
silencing and authoritative in that it stems from the right of the person to make the request 
rather than the weighing of pre-existing reasons for or against doing the action requested. So, 
there is reason to think of request as a normative power (as Løgstrup suggests by including it 
with promise and order in his list of speech acts requiring authority [see KAV 250]). 
What is the recipient of a request under an obligation to do? Minimally, they are 
under an obligation to give some recognitive response. However, it might be that a person 
would rightly feel that they had been treated contemptuously if their request was dismissed 
without any consideration. A better understanding would be that in issuing a request a person 
puts the recipient under an obligation to give the request the appropriate recognitive 
response. And what seems appropriate in this situation seems to be due consideration. (What 
due consideration involves will depend on various things such as the nature of the thing or 
action requested, how much is at stake in acceding or refusing, how burdensome complying 
with the request would be, what relationship one has or wants to have with the person 
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involved,56 KRZVWURQJRQH¶VULJKWVDUHWRWKHWKLQJUHTXHVWHGWKHDOWHUQDWLYHZD\VIRUWKH
person to get what they have requested, and so on.) 
Now we can understand an appeal as related to a request in that, when valid, it puts a 
person under an obligation to give a matter serious consideration. Sometimes we are under 
obligations to give matters serious consideration. Take, for instance, the case of assessing a 
PhD thesis or reviewing a paper for a journal. There is a professional or role-obligation in 
WKHVHFDVHVWRJLYHRQH¶VDVVHVVPHQWVHULRXVWKRXJKWDQGWRHQJDJHZLWKWKHSLHFHRIZRUN
one is dealing with. It might also be argued that those who have the authority to order their 
subjects to do or refrain from certain actions are also under a role-obligation to give their 
orders serious consideration before they issue them. But if there is such a thing as an appeal, 
in this sense, then one person can put another under an obligation to give some matter serious 
consideration performatively, that is, by making an appeal. For instance, if a student appeals 
a mark or a defendant appeals a conviction, then, assuming that the appeal is valid and the 
person has the right to make it, those reviewing the decision have been placed under an 
obligation to give their appeal serious consideration by reviewing the circumstances of the 
original assessment, whether the correct procedures were followed, whether the matter was 
given proper consideration at that time, and so on. What is necessary here is that the appeal 
should be reviewed in a spirit of openness rather than with a preferred conclusion already in 
mind. Another kind of appeal might be where one person issues an appeal for help. Of 
course, one might aOVRLVVXHDUHTXHVWIRUKHOSEXWWKHXVHRI³DSSHDO´LQGLFDWHVWKDWZHDUH
dealing with a matter that is weightier or perhaps more urgent than mere request. Again, 
reviewing the appeal in a spirit of openness seems to be what is required by the appeal. An 
DSSHDOLVOLNHDUHTXHVWLQWKDWRQHLVZLWKLQRQH¶VULJKWVQRWWRFRPSO\EXWQRQ-compliance is 
required to be preceded by serious consideration in which one thinks through the possibility 
of compliance, imaginatively confronting the consequences both of compliance and refusal. 
We are now in a position to see the possibility of interpreting proclamation as a 
normative power. Like request and appeal, proclamation leaves the recipient free to refuse 
what it presents. This is important because proclamation usually concerns matters of decisive 
LPSRUWDQFHQRWDOZD\VEXWPRVWO\DQGLIZHDFFHSW/¡JVWUXS¶VFRQFHUQVDERXWDXWKRULW\
then we can say that it would be wrong for one person to claim the right to dictate to another 
what their fundamental orientation should be. However, like request and appeal and other 
exercises of authority, proclamation does place recipients under an obligation to open 
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themselves to serious consideration of what it presents. Unlike request and appeal, however, 
the personal characteristics of the person doing the proclaiming drop out as irrelevant. The 
obligation to give serious consideration does not depend on the urgency of the situation, or 
the nature of what is requested, the available alternatives, and so on. Rather, what gives one 
an obligation to respond to proclamation would be the office occupied by the proclaimer. 
Thus, the obligation is owed to the person doing the proclaiming not because of their 
personal characteristics but because they occupy the office of proclamation and because they 
thereby have an authority, inherited from the divine, to speak about matters of fundamental 
significance and have us pay open-hearted attention to them.  
Picking up on the point raised at the end of the previous subsection, this dimension of 
proclamation shows why preaching to the already converted can make sense if the point of 
SURFODPDWLRQLVQRWVRPXFKWRDOWHUUHFLSLHQWV¶EHOLHILQWKHFRQWHQWRIZKDWLVSURFODLPHGEXW
rather to alter their normative situation by placing recipients under an obligation to reflect 
appropriately. This makes sense because faith can be fragile and needs to be refreshed by 
UHQHZHGUHIOHFWLRQRQRQH¶VIXQGDPHQWDORULHQWDWLRQSuch reflection can be occasioned by 
the proclaimer putting one under an obligation to do so. Furthermore, proclaiming to the non-
converted makes sense because it is precisely through responding to an obligation to open-
hearted reflection on matters of decisive significance for the individual that, it is hoped, 
conversion might come about.  
 
5.3 Proclamation as Forgiveness 
Finally, we can turn to a third form of proclamation, which links up with our earlier reading 
RI/¡JVWUXS¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHDXWKRULW\RI-HVXV±±namely proclamation of divine forgiveness. 
As we saw earlier (in §2 above), in resisting the concern that proclamation might be seen as a 
kind of coercion, Løgstrup argued that proclamation does not involve the authority of 
command but could involve the authority of forgiveness. This provides us with a further way 
of interpreting proclamation as a normative power, since it is arguably plausible to see 
forgiveness as a normative power.57 After all, it is a common thought that forgiveness 
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involves restoring relations between victim and offender and that it is something that only the 
victim can do. Furthermore, it is unsatisfying to think of the change characteristic of 
forgiveness in solely psychological terms²say, as a change of heart. While forgiveness often 
involves a change of heart, it also involves a change in the rights and obligations of the 
parties affected by wrongdoing. When we think, for instance, of forgiveness as something 
that can be given or bestowed, it looks as though the victim, in forgiving, has discretionary 
authority to make some normative change in the situation. This normative change might be 
one that somehow allows the parties involved to put the act behind them. But forgiveness 
also commits the victim to putting the act behind them, since forgiveness is something a 
victim cannot, except in special circumstances, take back.  
For these reasons, it is attractive to think of forgiveness as a power held by the victim 
of an offense to restore a relation with an offender by altering the obligations that arise as a 
result of the offense. For instance, forgiveness might involve the victim waiving their right to 
apology or compensation and undertaking a commitment to leave the matter in the past. On 
this view, forgiveness is a power to alter bipolar obligations that arise from the situation of 
wrongdoing. This power is exercised by a performative speech act, and it involves the victim, 
in virtue of their status as victim, having a certain kind of authority to decide whether or not 
to alter those obligations.  
In the case of divine forgiveness, it is God who is conceived of as the (ultimate) 
victim of our wrongdoing. This might make it problematic to see how, if I wrong someone, 
there can be two victims: both the human person whom I wrong, who therefore has a power 
to forgive, but also God, who must be conceived as a victim in a different sense. One way of 
thinking about this is that God is the victim of every wrong because he is the source of moral 
laws, and because in doing wrong (even when we wrong identifiable human victims) we 
violate his authority. However, this might take us into the problematic territory of a divine 
command interpretation of morality. But if we reject the idea that God creates morality from 
his own authority, in what sense can we still think of him as the victim of all our wrongdoing, 
who therefore has the power to forgive us?  
Løgstrup himself offers an interesting response to this question²which he is required 
to do, as his rejection of a divine command theory means he cannot take the option canvassed 
above. Instead, in the introduction to The Ethical Demand, he follows the theologian 
Friedrich Gogarten and argues that it is in our relation to our neighbor that our relation to 
God is also decided so that in failing to love our neighbor, our relation to God is likewise 
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damaged (see ED 4±5/EF 12±14). This explains why this failure calls for divine forgiveness 
and thus generates the authority we have been discussing. 
 1RZLWLVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWRQWKLV³SURFODPDWLRQDVIRUJLYHQHVV´LQWHUSUHWDWLRQZKDW
is done in proclamation is not just testifying that the recipient has been forgiven (by someone 
else). This would amount to a proclamation about a fact, with the proclaimer offering 
assurance to the recipient that they, the proclaimer, know that the recipient has been forgiven 
by God. By contrast, the idea here is that proclamation is the giving of forgiveness and that 
proclamation involves an exercise of normative authority because forgiveness involves such 
authority. On this view, therefore, in proclaiming the Word of God, Jesus bestows 
forgiveness on his audience. If only the victim of some wrong can have the authority to 
forgive that wrong, and if God is the victim of the wrongs that Jesus forgives, then Jesus can 
do this only because he is *RG7KLVLVSUHFLVHO\ZK\IRU/¡JVWUXSLWLV-HVXV¶SURFODPDWion 
WKDWKHLVEHVWRZLQJ*RG¶VIRUJLYHQHVVRQXVWKDWUDLVHVWKHUHDOTXHVWLRQRIKLVGLYLQHQDWXUH
which is not raised in the same way if he is testifying or appealing because he might do either 
of these on behalf of God without at the same time being God (see ED 211±2/EF 236±8).58   
However, if proclamation is thought of as an act of forgiveness, there is an important 
question of whether anyone other than Jesus can proclaim in this sense. Løgstrup argues that 
divine authority can be inherited through the office of proclamation. But does that mean that 
WKRVHZKRKDYHWKDWRIILFHZLWKLQWKH&KXUFKFDQIRUJLYHRQ-HVXV¶EHKDOI",IVRWKLVPXVWEH
because of Jesus (or God) having explicitly invested that office with this power, since the 
requirement that only the victim holds the power to forgive means that it is not usually 
permissible, or even possible, to forgive on behalf of another person. Otherwise, all that those 
who proclaim could do in relation to forgiveness is to testify their knowledge that we are, or 
will be, forgiven by God. Because, as we have seen, Løgstrup just focuses on the broad 
distinction between communication and proclamation in his article, he does not analyze the 
distinction between the types of proclamation that we have been considering or deal with this 
issue LQ³7KH&DWHJRU\DQGWKH2IILFHRI3URFODPDWLRQ´but it may well be one of the matters 
RI³JUHDWWKHRORJLFDOLQWHUHVW´WKDWKHVHWVDVLGHDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRIKLVSDSHU (KAV 250). 
Moreover, the distinction between proclamation as testimony and proclamation as appeal 
allows Løgstrup a response to a Kierkegaardian criticism that if it is only God who has the 
authority to forgive and officers in the Church do not, then proclamations by officers in the 
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Church become testimonial or objective in form. Once the distinction between proclamation 
as testimony and proclamation as appeal has been made, this problem does not follow 
because Løgstrup can now construe the proclamations of officers in the Church as appeals 
that involve their audience in the kind of subjective engagement that is suitable to the 
religious case. 
 
6. Conclusion 
From our discussion above, it is thus to be hoped that what may appear to be a rather abstruse 
article by a somewhat obscure Danish philosopher has in fact been shown to be of 
considerable interest and significance at two main levels: first, as a critique of Kierkegaard 
and his commitment to the method of indirect communication; and second, in the questions 
Løgstrup raises concerning the speech act of proclamation and the form of authority it might 
be said to involve. The article is also important for the way in which it prefigures some of 
/¡JVWUXS¶VNH\FRQFHUQVthat were developed in more detail in his later works, both as this 
relates to his continuing critique of Kierkegaard and to how his own positive position 
unfolded, partly as a result of that critique.  
 
 
We are grateful to Bjørn Rabjerg and Genia Schönbaumsfeld for their comments on this 
paper. 
 
 
 
 
